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NOISE NUISANCES: COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES v. OWNERS
OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
The problems of the reciprocal use and enjoyment of property by
adjacent landowners have become increasingly pronounced in our
time of intense urbanization. Salient has been the problem of noise
nuisances which frequently result when adjacent property is devoted
to the inconsistent uses of industry and residence ownership. This
conflict is often a serious one. The enjoyment by the residence owner
of his property may be considerably impaired; the abatement of
the noise may be at the price of loss of productivity, considerable
expense or of not conducting the business at all.' The resulting situa-
tion is one which requires a most careful balancing of equities.
There are certain basic legal distinctions or classifications in the
law of nuisance which afford the courts some aid in dealing with'
the problem of noise nuisances. Nuisances are characterized as public
or private;2 they may or may not be nuisances per se3 or they may be
defined by statute.4 By focusing attention upon the particular activity
complained of the court may discern such further distinctions as that
the invasion of the plaintiff's interest is negligent, or intentional,
or that the defendant is engaged in ultra-hazardous activity.5 Further,
the courts may grant damages if injunctive relief would work hard-
ship. The judicial resolution of the conflicting interests in nuisances
cases has been little aided, however, by such legal analyses; the
courts are required to reach an equitable result in differing fact
1. Professor Lloyd in his article Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. or PA. L. REv.
567 (1934), observes that few noise nuisance suits involve nationally important
industries. Such suits can, however, involve quite serious injury to both
parties. E.g., Gault v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 102 F. Supp. 187
(D. Md.), aifd, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952) (gas pipe line compressor station,
built at considerable cost, created noise and vibration which greatly disturbed
nearby owners of costly suburban homes); Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons,
216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932) ($400,000 tile factory near residential property
required to limit its operations because of the noise created by it).
2. "A public nuisance is an act or omission which obstructs or causes
inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to
all." PROSSER, TORTS § 72 (1941). "Private nuisance is an unreasonable inter-
ference with the interest in the use and enjoyment of land." PROSSER, TORTS §
73 (1941); WooD, NuisANcEs §§ 14-16 (2d ed. 1883); 39 Am. JuR., Nuisances
§§ 7-9 (1942).
3. See 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances § 11 (1942), discussing the distinction be-
tween nuisances per se and per accidens. PROSSER, TORTS 563-65 (1941) uses
the term "absolute" nuisances.
4. 39 Am. JUR., Nuisances §§ 9, 12-15, 204, 205 (1942); 66 C.J.S., Nuisances
§ 7 (1950).
5. PROSSER, TORTS § 71 (1941); 39 Am. Jur., Nuisance §§ 4, 24 (1942). For
an excellent discussion of these distinctions see Prosser, Nuisance without
Fault, 20 TEXAs L. REV. 399, 410-20 (1942), wherein the author shows that
in the case of ultrahazardous activity the courts have unconsciously made
use of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.
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situations of varying and interdependent elements.6
The purpose of this note is to present the various elements given
consideration in noise nuisance cases. It is emphasized that an atom-
ized approach belies somewhat the true import of the various ele-
ments. They are necessarily related and given a gestalt effect in a
particular case. The authority employed will, so far as possible, be
limited to cases where the noise of a commercial enterprise was the
sole or principal interference involved.1
CHARACTER OF THE AREA
The golden rule of property ownership with regard to creating
nuisances is that one must not use his property so as to injure that
of another.8 Necessarily, however, those who reside in urban areas
must submit to some discomfort or injury because of the inherent
presence of noise in such localities and the significant value to society
of manufacturing enterprises.9 The courts have compromised this
conflict of interests by enforcing only that degree of quiet which is
reasonable in the light of the locality and other elements.1 0 Thus,
6. "For time out of mind the term 'nuisance' has been regarded as in-
capable of definition so as to fit all cases, because the controlling facts are
seldom alike, and each case stands on its own footing. We are not aided by
the classification into public or private nuisances, because the difference
between them does not depend on the nature of the thing done, but on the
fact that one affects the public at large, and the other a limited number only.
... The injury may be to person or property, to health, comfort, safety, or
morality. It may be a crime." Melker v. City of New York, 190 N.Y. 481,
488, 83 N.E. 565, 567 (1908).
7. For collections of cases dealing with particular businesses, devices, or
animals as noise nuisances see Notes, 23 A.L.R.2d 1289 (1952) (loud speakers
used for business purposes), 86 A.L.R. 998 (1933) (bakery); 81 A.L.R. 1207
(1932) (poultry plants), 79 A.L.R. 1060, (1932) (dogs), 41 A.L.R. 626 (1926),
(ice plant), 38 A.L.R. 1506 (1925), 31 A.L.R. 187 (1924) (creamery and milk
plants), 37 A.L.R. 800 (1925) (water or electric light plant), 37 A.L.R. 689
(1925) (saw mill), 33 A.L.R. 727 (1924) (amusement park), 23 A.L.R. 1412
(1924) (gasworks), 22 A.L.R. 1200 (1923) (mechanical music devices), 4
A.L.R. 1343 (1919) (steam whistles).
As to industrial noises generally see Notes, 90 A.L.R. 1207 (1934), 23
A.L.R. 1407 (1923). See also: Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. oF PA. L. REV.
567 (1934); Notes, 14 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 131 (1938) (automobile patrons), 4
OKLA. L. REV. 501 (1951) (noise of queue), 25 VA. L. REV. 465 (1939); 3 MD.
L. REv. 240 (1939) (on nebulous decrees against noise nuisances); 29 MINN L.
REV. 38 (1944) (airports); 9 Omo ST. L.J. 537 (1948) (airports); 15 OaE. L.
REV. 268 (recreational activities).
8. The common-law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is ever
present in nuisance cases.
9. "People who live in great cities that are sustained by manufacturing
enterprises must necessarily be subject to many annoyances and positive
discomforts . . .produced by and resulting from the business that supports
the city." Commonwealth v. Miller, 139 Pa. St. 77, 21 Atl. 138, 139 (1891);
"'extreme rights' cannot be enforced." Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216
Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371, 373 (1914).
10. Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933); Stevens
v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914); Kobielski v.
Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich. 656, 193 N.W. 214 (1923);
Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871); Kestner v. Homeopathic Medical
& Surgery Hospital of Reading, 245 Pa. 326, 91 Atl. 659 (1914).
NOTES
when a commercial enterprise intrudes into a purely residential
area, the noise emanating from its operations has been judicially
abated during normal hours of repose when it interfered with the
sleep of nearby residents,1 and has been enjoined altogether when
it seriously impaired the normal enjoyment of residential property.1 2
Similarly, the pastoral quietude of rural areas is preserved in favor
of homeowners.1
3
The problem of noise and the relational use of property becomes
more difficult when the particular area is not clearly devoted to a
single use. If the use made of such property is mixed industrial
and residential, the degree of protection afforded homeowners is
diminished; the standard of reasonableness, however, although more
flexible, is still imposed.' 4 The industrial nature of a locality has in
some instances virtually precluded any right to relief,'5 but such
homeowners are clearly not deprived of some reasonable use of their
land for residential purposes.' 6 The situation most difficult of com-
11. Peacock v. Spitzelberger, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 803, 29 S.W. 877 (1895); Shea
v. National Ice Cream Co., 280 Mass. 206, 182 N.E. 303 (1932); Kobielski v.
Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich. 656, 193 N.W. 214 (1923);
Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 200 N.W. 350 (1924);
Friedman v. Keil, 113 N.J. Eq. 37, 166 At]. 194 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933); Kroecker
v. Camden Coke Co., 82 N.J. Eq. 373, 88 Atl. 955 (1913) (area termed as
"densely populated section of a city").
12. Bickley v. Morgan Utilities Co., 173 Ark. 1038, 294 S.W. 38 (1927);
Muskegon Trust Co. v. Bousma, 247 Mich. 98, 225 N.W. 611 (1929); Krocker v.
Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 Atl. 669 (1922); Appeal of
Ladies' Decorative Art Club of Philadelphia, 22 W.N. Cas. 75, 13 Atl. 537 (Pa.
1888); Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 35 R.I. 198, 85 Atl. 924 (1913); Citizen's
Planing Mill Co. v. Tunstall, 160 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Powell v.
Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085 (1891).
13. Gault v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 102 F. Supp. 187 (D.
Md.), ajfd, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952); Alabama Power Co. v. Stringfellow,
228 Ala. 422, 153 So. 629 (1934) (small unincorporated community); Frank v.
Cossitt Cement Products, Inc., 197 Misc, 670, 97 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
14. In such situations the character of the area seemingly loses the aspect
of control, and the right to relief is more dependent upon other elements.
East Arkansas Const. Co. v. James, 211 Ark. 154, 199 S.W.2d 589 (1947)
(lawful business enjoined from disturbing sleep); Froelicher v. Oswald
Ironworks, 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903) (a case of extreme noise nuisance);
Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914) (court
carefully balanced decree so as to preserve industrial operations and at the
same time eliminate offensive noise); Eastcott v. Metal Craft Co., 254 Mich.
513, 236 N.W. 847 (1931) (required only partial abatement).
15. Kasper v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 291 Mass. 24, 196 N.E. 149 (1935)
(complainant failed to show requisite amount of disturbance); Hauser v.
Kraeuter & Co. 97 N.J. 413, 129 Atl. 437 (1925) (defendant's enterprise caused
considerable noise which was the most salient among the dlisturbances in the
area, but plaintiff was refused relief); Haber v. Paramount Ice Corp., 239
App. Div. 324, 267 N.Y. Supp. 349 (2d Dep't 1933) (character of area seemingly
prevented injunctive relief, new trial on question of damages); Fiscaletti v.
Long Island Quilting Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (court gave con-
sideration to the facts that there were other noises in the area, that defendant
conducted his operations without negligence, and with proper appliances;
the focus of the court's attention on the industrial character of the area
caused it to deny an injunction).
16. Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932); Wheat
Culvert Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Malm v. Dubrey,
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promise is that where the locality under consideration embraces
the marginal line between commercial user and residential areas,
and the lands of the commercial user and residence owner are ad-
jacent and devoted to respectively consistent uses. The commercial
user is not permitted to maintain a sound nuisance so as to deprive
the residence owner of reasonable enjoyment of his property, but
the element of the character of the area is seemingly without in-
fluence;17 there being no inconsistent use of such.
A corollary problem is the question of the use as sanctioned by
zoning ordinances. A showing that a particular enterprise is located
in accordance with zoning requirements is not a license to create a
nuisance,' but such ordinances have been influential in the denial
of relief to residence owners whose homes are located in areas zoned
for enterprises which they should clearly -have known would emit
considerable noise.19 Non-conforming use statutes have protected
commercial enterprises which were properly located before the area
changed in character or was re-zoned,20 but not if the noise has
increased 2' or the business has changed character2
Commercial enterprises often seek to defend suits to abate noise
.nuisances by showing that there are similar disturbances in the area.
This attempted justification has been found to be without merit as
a defense by some courts.23 Such a showing is an element for consider-
'325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E.2d 900 (1949); Waier v. Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398,
251 N.W. 552 (1933); Wallace & Tiernan Co., v. United States Cutlery Co., 97
N.J. Eq. 408, 128 Atl. 872 (Ch. 1925) (both parties manufacturers); Quinn
v. American Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 Atl. 855 (1928).
17. Beauvais v. D. C. Hall Transport, Inc., 49 So.2d 44 (La. App. 1950);
Garber v. Rubel Corporation, 160 Misc. 716, 290 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
18. Gault v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 102 F. Supp. 187 (D.
Md.), affd, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952); Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216
Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932); Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry, 85 Cal. App.
388, 259 Pac. 484 (1927); Malm v. Dubrey, 325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E.2d 900 (1949);
Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933); Marshall
v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 177 N.E. 504 (1931) ; Masso v. Hanscom Realty Corp.
162 Misc. 864, 295 N.Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
19. Leblane v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 46 So. 226 (1908); Hauser
v. Kraeuter & Co., 97 N.J. 413, 129 Atl. 473 (1925); Wojnar v. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co., 348 Pa. 595, 36 A.2d 321 (1944).
20. Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Ariz. 17 198 P.2d 134 (1948); City of Chicago
v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works, Inc., 398 ill. 202, 75 N.E.2d 355 (1947); Firth v.
Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 443 (1951). In the case of Adams v. Kalamazoo
Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928), a commercial enterprise
was protected by a nonconforming use statute when prior to operation a
new zoning ordinance prohibiting the intended use was passed.
21. Benjamin v.*Lietz, 116 Utah 476, 211 P.2d 449 (1949).
22. Morris v. Borough of Haledon, 20 N.J. Super. 433, 90 A.2d 113 (1952).
Zoning ordinances frequently include by-laws which provide that although
a particular use is permissible, no use which constitutes a common law nuis-
ance is protected by the statute. Malm v. Dubrey, 325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E.2d
900 (1949).
23. Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932); Judson
v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581 (1910); Froelicher
v. Oswald Ironworks. 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903): Fox v. Ewers. 195 Md.
650, 75 A.2d 357 (1950); Simon v. Detroit Motor Valve Co., 233 Mich. 17,
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NOTES
ation,2 however, perhaps as being indicative of the character of the
area.2
It is clear that the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" has been
exploded by the American courts.26 This would seem to be especially
true if the noise complained of has been increased.27 The priority of
a commercial enterprise in the particular area is of influence, how-
ever, in determining a residence owner's right to injunctive relief. 28
Similarly the fact that the complainant had established his residence
before the defendant business began operations is given considera-
tion.
29
THE TimE AmD TYPE OF NoIsE
The noise emanating from a particular enterprise can well be a
nuisance at some times and not at others.30 It is generally conceded
that mankind has sanctioned night as a time of repose;81 consequently
injunctions issue against commercial property owners whose opera-
tions interfere with the sleep of adjacent residents,32 but not in
206 N.W. 336 (1925); Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. Doyle, 73 N.J.L.
521, 64 Atl. 156 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
24. Beauvais v. D. C. Hall Transport, Inc., 49 So.2d 44 (La. App. 1950);
Fiscaletti v. Long Island Quilting Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Goodall v. Crofton, 33 Ohio St. Rep. 271 (1877); Kennedy v. Frechette, 45
R.I. 399 123 Atl. 146 (1924).
25. Irby v. Panama Ice Co., Inc., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 307 (1936); Olsen
v. Tung, 179 La. 760, 155 So. 16 (1934); Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174
S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943).
26. Fendley v. City of Anaheim, 110 Cal. App. 731, 294 Pac. 769 (1930);
Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry, 85 Cal. App. 385, 259 Pac. 484 (1927); 39 Am.
JUR., Nuisance § 197 (1942).
27. Friedman v. Keil, 113 N.J. Eq. 37, 166 Atl. 194 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
28. McClung v. Louisville & N.R.R., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So.2d 371 (1951);
Mackenzie v. Frank M. Pauli Co., 207 Mich. 456, 174 N.W. 161 (1919); Morris
v. Borough of Haledon, 20 N.J. Super. 433, 90 A.2d 113 (Ch. 1952); Benton
v. Kernan, 130 N.J. Eq. 193, 21 A.2d 755 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941); De File v.
Hudson Republican Corp., 151 Misc. 256, 272 N.Y. Supp. 448 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
29. Walsworth v. Farmers' Gin Co., 161 La. 246, 110 So. 338 (1926);
Froelicher v. Oswald Ironworks, 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Leeds v.
Bohemian Art Glass Works, 63 N.J. Eq. 619, 52 Atl. 375 (Ch. 1902); Hamilton
v. Bates, 284 Pa. 513, 131 Atl. 369 (1925).
30. 39 Amv. JuR., Nuisance § 51 (1942).
31. "Mankind needs sleep for a succession of several hours once in every
24 hours, and nature was provided a time for that purpose, to wit, the night-
time . . .and noises which would not be adjudged nuisances, under the cir-
cumstances, if made in the daytime, will be declared to be nuisances if made
at night. . . ." Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 27, 53
Atl. 289 (Ch. 1902).
32. East Arkansas Const. Co. v. James, 211 Ark. 154, 199 S.W.2d 589 (1947);
Hill v. McBurney Oil & Fertilizer Co., 112 Ga. 788, 38 S.E. 42 (1901); Wheat
Culvert Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Maim v. Dubrey,
325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E.2d 900 (1949); Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289 (1882);
O'Connor v. Jersey Creamery Co. of Detroit, 265 Mich. 219, 251 N.W. 333
(1933); Abend v. Royal Laundry Service, Inc., 122 N.J. Eq. 77, 192 Atl. 239
(Ch. 1937); Frank v. Cossitt Cement Products, 197 Misc. 670, 97 N.Y.S.2d 337
(Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Masso v. Hanscom Realty Corp., 162 Misc. 864, 295 N.Y. Supp.
922 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Firth v. Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 443 (1951); City
of Bethlehem v. Druckenmiller, 344 Pa. 170, 25 A.2d 190 (1942).
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favor of a complainant who sleeps during the day.3 3 Similarly the
seasonal effect of noise can be of influence.3 4 An asphalt plant which
was operated only sixty days a year has been held a public nuisance. 3
In accordance with what is reasonable in a given situation the courts
have limited operations to the usual daylight hours,30 certain periods
of the day,3 7 to the normal work week,38 or have totally enjoined
that noise which constituted a clear nuisance.30
Can the nature of the noise influence the court's decision? The
answer is clearly that it can, but it would seem to be the effect of the
noise in a given situation 0 which is important, and not the proximity
of the parties 1 or the volume or intensity of the din.
42
The attempt by the courts to classify various types of sounds and
determine whether such are actionable as nuisances is obviously futile
when done in abstraction without giving consideration to the effect
of such sounds. Thus the monotonous sound of an air conditioner did
not constitute a nuisance,43 but the monotonous sound of an electric
substation was as actionable as harsh and intermittent sounds:
1"
Similarly, noise of clanging tank-car tops and loud talking so inter-
fered with the enjoyment of adjacent property as to justify preventive
relief,'4 5 but the slamming of car doors and boisterous conduct of
fishermen in early morning hours was thought not to be actionable.
40
Music may be a nuisance,4 7 but the question of what is music is not
abundantly clear.
48
33. Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907).
34. Kasper v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 291 Mass. 24, 196 N.E. 149 (1935).
35. Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678 (1933).
36. See note 32 supra.
37. Jones v. Kelley Trust Co., 179 Ark. 857, 18 S.W.2d 356 (1929).
38. McMillan v. Kuehnle, 76 N.J. Eq. 256, 73 Atl. 1054 (Ch. 1909).
39. City of Bethlehem v. Druckenmiller, 344 Pa. 170, 25 A.2d 190 (.1942);
Krocker v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 Atl. 669 (1922);
Appeal of Ladies' Decorative Art Club of Philadelphia, 22 W.N. Cas. 75, 13 Atl.
557 (Pa. 1888); Citizens' Planing Mill v. Tunstall, 160 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913); Benjamin v. Lietz, 116 Utah 476, 211 P.2d 449 (1949).
40. "The real test . . . is, whether it is of such a character as would be
likely to be physically annoying to a person of ordinary sensibilities ... "
WOOD, NuisAcEs § 617 (3d ed. 1893). For cases discussing this rule of effect
see note 74 infra.
41. McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908).
42. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d
857 (1941).
43. People on Complaint of Gershberg v. Arkow, 204 Misc. 635, 124 N.Y.S.2d
704 (N.Y. City Ct. 1953).
44. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d
857 (1941).
45. Waier v. Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933).
46. In Hobson v. Walker, 41 So.2d 789 (La. App. 1949), in a seemingly
absurd view as to the noise concerned, the court felt that fishermen, by the
nature of the sport they were about to undertake, would naturally be quiet
at a minnow shop some distance from the fishing grounds because when they
began to pursue the "denizens of the deep" silence would be required.
47. Stodder v. Rosen Talking Mach. Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N.E. 251 (1922);
Peters v. Moses, 171 Misc. 441, 12 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
48. See Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. oF PA. L. REV. 567, 578 (1934).
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A court may justify relief given by determining that the noise
complained of in a given situation is "unbearable"4 9 or has a "procliv-
ity" to wake people from their sleep,50 but such characterizations
are in light of the effect of the sound disturbance.
THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, FEASIBILITY
OF ABATEMENT, AND PUBLIC INTEREST
In almost every case of noise nuisance the value of the commercial
enterprise sought to be enjoined is considerably in excess of that
of the complaining residence owner. The inclusion of this element
patently converts the courts' consideration of balance of equities to
one of balancing interests.5 ' Such is not to be confused with a con-
sideration of the economic effect on the community, but rather, is
an appraisal by the court of what each party stands to lose. Some
courts, however, feel that it is an element deserving of judicial
recognition, 52 but it cannot be said to have the aspect of control.53
The most desirable solution to the problem of noise nuisances -is
the mechanical abatement of the noise so as to render the divergent
uses of adjacent property compatible. The expense involved, however,
may well be prohibitive. This consideration has been held to be the
test of whether or not noise was reasonable.54 A mandatory injunction
has required preventive measures when the cost of such was reason-
able and has been refused55 when at too great an expense.5 6 One
court, however, in a case of extreme interference with complainant's
enjoyment of his property, required cessation of the defendant's op-
erations or, in the alternative, abatement, the cost of which equalled
the value of complainant's property.5 7
What can be said in favor of the defense of the owner of a com-
mercial enterprise that 'he has done all he can to minimize the
disturbance? This is in essence defending on the basis of freedom
from negligence.58 Such is not per se a good defense,5 9 but has been
49. Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 35 R.I. 198, 85 Atl. 924 (1913).
50. Waier v. Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933).
51. As to balancing equities in nuisance cases see WALSH, EQUrIY § 56
(1930); Note, 61 A.L.R. 924 (1929).
52. Kasper v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 291 Mass. 24, 196 N.E. 149 (1935) ; Roy
v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 262 Mich. 663, 247 N.W. 774 (1933).
53. See cases cited note 1 supra; 39 Am. JUR., Nuisance § 159 (1942).
54. Ebur v. Alloy Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155 Atl. 280 (1931); Collins
v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (1910).
55. Eastcott v. Metal Craft Co., 254 Mich. 513, 236 N.W. 847 (1931).
56. Kasper v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 291 Mass. 24, 196 N.E. 149 (1935);
Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933).
57. Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 Atl. 855
(1928).
58. See PRoSSER, TORTS § 71 (1941).
59. Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581
(1910); Froelicher v. Oswald Ironworks, 111 La. 705, 35 So. 821 (1903); Sus-
quehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Spangler, 86 Md. 562, 39 Atl. 270 (1898); Wallace
& Tiernan Co. v. United States Cutlery Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 408, 128 Atl. 872 (Ch.
1925); Fiscaletti v. Long Island Quilting Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
1954 ]
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employed by the courts in behalf of a defendant to bolster his case
when other elements are in his favor.6 0
It is generally conceded that public convenience or that a certain
business is useful and necessary is not a defense to a suit to enjoin
a nuisance.61 Such considerations are, however, of influence in de-
termining the propriety of equitable relief.62 The problem is that of
minimizing the detrimental effects arising from inconsistent use of
adjacent property; to protect residential property from disturbing
noise and at the same time allow businesses which are beneficial to the
public to operate.P
This attitude is doubtless manifested by the court's willingness to
enjoin only that noise which unreasonably interferes with complain-
ant's enjoyment of his property,64 and in their reluctance to grant
relief other than damages when the defendant is a quasi-public cor-
poration. 65 Complete enjoining of operations has been found to be
error.66 It has been held that the element of public convenience is
of influence only if the public interest is direct, and relates to the
activity which is sought to be enjoined.6
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Pa. 417, 31 A.2d (1943).
61. 39 Am. JUR., Nuisance §§ 45, 161 (1942).
62. Ibid.
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private injury, if any, and seek some other method of relief than by in-
junction." Miranda v. Buffalo General Electric Co., 139 Misc. 532, 248 N.Y.
Supp. 758, 760 (injunction refused), 140 Misc. 267, 251 N.Y. Supp. 510 (Sup.
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Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665 (1944).
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66. McMenomy v. Baud, 87 Cal. 134, 26 Pac. 795 (1890).
67. "[Tjhe public . . . interest in having the plant continued in operation,
... is a matter of no moment, unless the interest is direct and appertains
to that of which the plaintiff has a just cause to complain." Quinn v. American
Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 Atl. 855, 857 (1928). What is meant
by "direct" is not certain. It would seem to indicate a distinction between the
usual commercial enterprise and a quasi-public corporation. See also 61
A.L.R. 924, 933 (1929). As to defense of necessary war production see Godard
v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 313 Mass. 280, 47 N.E.2d 303 (1943).
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NOTES
THEm REQuIsiTE DEGREE OF INTERFERENCE
The determination of whether the noise produced by a particular
defendant's business constitutes a nuisance necessarily involves proof
of injury by the complaining residence owner. The question arises
as to what type of injury will support preventive or compensatory
relief in favor of such complainants. As in other nuisance suits the
loss of comfortable enjoyment, 8 diminished property value,6 lessened
rental, 0 loss of reasonable utility of property,71 or that the property
is a less desirable place to live72 has been held sufficient to justify
compensatory relief.
In order to gain preventive relief from noise, however, the com-
plainant is required to prove the detrimental effect 3 of such sound
disturbance on the occupants of his property. The degree of noise re-
quired to support injunctive relief is that which produces actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibili-
ties.1 4 Such noise may constitute a nuisance even though no physical
injury to the health of the occupants is shown 5 The fact that a
68. Nailor v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 117 Conm. 241, 167 Atl. 548
(1933); McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908);
Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857
(1941); Di Carlo v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327
(1933); Beauvais v. D. C. Hall Transport, Inc., 49 So.2d 44 (La. App. 1950);
Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp., 280 Mass. 469, 182 N.E. 825 (1932); Citizens'
Planing Mill Co. v. Tunstall, 160 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
69. Alabama Power Co. v. Stringfellow, 228 Ala. 422, 153 So. 629 (1934);
Garber v. Rubel Corp., 160 Misc. 716, 290 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Gainesville H. & W.R. v. Hall, 78 Tex. 169, 14 S.W. 259 (1890).
70. Harris v. Randolph Lumber Co., 175 Ala. 148, 57 So. 453 (1911); McGill
v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908); Kasper v.
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 291 Mass. 24, 196 N.E. 149 (1935); Tortorella v. H.
Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933); Masso v. Hanscom Realty
Corp., 162 Misc. 864, 295 N.Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
71. Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. United States Cutlery Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 408,
128 Atl. 872 (Ch. 1925).
72. Sardo v. James Russell Boiler Works, 241 Mass. 215, 135 N.E. 127 (1922)
(damages awarded because the property became a less desirable place to
live due to defendant's activity even though the value of the property had
increased).
73. See note 40 supra.
74. Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932);
McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908); Ken-
tucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857 (1941);
Meyer v. Kemper Ice Co., 180 La. 1037, 158 So. 378 (1934); Fox v. Ewers, 195
Md. 650, 75 A.2d 357 (1950); Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516 (1879); Marshall
v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 177 N.E. 504 (1931); Benton v. Kernan, 130 N.J.
Eq. 193, 21 A.2d 755 (Ct. of Err. & App. 1941); Damadio v. Levinsohn, 111
N.J. Eq. 84, 161 Ati. 504 (1932); Fiscaletti v. Long Island Quilting Co., 81
N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Masso v. Hanscom Realty Corp., 162 Misc. 864,
295 N.Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Haber v. Paramount Ice Corp. 239 App.
Div. 324, 267 N.Y. Supp. 349 (2d Dep't 1933); Dillon v. Cortland Baking Co.,
244 App. Div. 303, 230 N.Y. Supp. 289 (3d Dep't 1928); Blomen v. N. Barstow
Co., 35 R.I. 198, 85 Atl. 924 (1913); Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture
Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085 (1891); WooD, NuiSANCES § 17 (3d ed. 1893).
75. Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581
(1910); Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932);
Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294 (1868).
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person of unusual sensitivity is disturbed does not mean that the
noise concerned is a nuisance,76 and conversely the lack of detri-
mental effect on particularly robust individuals does not mean that
no nuisance exists.7 The term "ordinary" employed in this test means
individuals in the broadest sense, and not the usual type of person
who would be expected to live in a paIticular area.78 When a threat-
ened or apprehended noise interference is sought to be enjoined
the complainant is required to prove with great clarity that the
impending operations will become a nuisance, unless such enterprise
would constitute a nuisance per se.
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CONCLUSION
By a careful consideration of these elements the conflicting inter-
ests of adjacent property owners can be rationalized to a point of
fairness between the parties, but the volumes of such decisions do
not yield the certainty and consistency of property use which is most
desirable. There is no perfect judicial remedy for noise nuisances.
The courts by the nature of the problem are required to weigh and
evaluate the facts of each case, and are therefore virtually precluded
from being able to propound sufficiently precise rules which might
solve the problem. Conceivably, a greater emphasis on the element
of the character of the area as being controlling would by judicial
coercion provide the desired result of large urban areas devoted solely
to residential or commercial usage. Courts of equity strive to reach
decisions of great fairness and justice, but the result is inevitably
one of compromise which leaves the goal of perfect use of property
unattained. If this end is sought for urban areas the rights of existing
property owners must in some measure be limited. Legislative action
in the form of stringent abatement laws and perhaps mandatory
relocation of property owners whose uses are inconsistent with that
of the general area are possible solutions. The latter could in fairness
be required only after an extended period of notice and just compensa-
tion. City planning, well considered and extensive, coupled with
sufficient legislative action would seem to be the best means of ap-
proaching the goal of the greatest use of property without nuisance.
G. H. KFmKF
76. Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933).
77. Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914).
78. Metropoulos v. MacPherson, 241 Mass. 491, 135 N.E. 693 (1922).
79. Buckner v. Tillman, 195 Ark. 149, 110 S.W.2d 1060 (1937); Wingate v.
City of Doerun, 177 Ga. 373, 170 S.E. 226 (1933); 39 Am. JUR., Nuisance §§
151, 152 (1942).
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